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It is now a platitude that diversity is not to be tolerated as a necessary evil, but to be celebrated as 
a positive good. It is also a well-worn, if more controversial, claim that universal conceptions of 
justice are a danger to our much-celebrated diversity. This latter idea is at the heart of everything 
from the leftist critique of liberalism as racist, sexist, and imperialist to the reactionary defense of 
folkish communities against rootless cosmopolitanism. Not only much of the political theory of 
our era, but also much of the actual political conflict, is devoted to the struggle between diverse 
particularities and universal principles. 
The public-reason-based account of political liberalism developed by John Rawls late in his 
career can be understood as a response to diversity-based objections to his earlier theory of 
justice, constructed as it was behind a veil of ignorance that hid all our differences. The later 
Rawls sought to defend his theory as a free-standing moral module that could be the object of an 
overlapping consensus among a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Several decades 
and a vast literature later, Rawls’s critics have not been satisfied. Rawls was still demanding too 
much substantive agreement, still excluding too many worldviews as unreasonable. As Ryan 
Muldoon complains, even public-reason liberalism is still “ultimately an account of sameness, 
not difference” (p. 7). 
In political philosophy, as in comedy, timing is everything. If it had appeared twenty years ago, 
Muldoon’s short monograph on diversity could have been a minor sensation. Appearing at a time 
when public reason liberalism is on its last legs—overtaken both by new theoretical fashions and 
by a series of unfortunate events demonstrating that liberalism was never really the object of 
either American or global consensus—his book is still well worth reading. Muldoon’s 
fundamental objection to Rawls may be far from new, but he is to be credited for taking it in 
interesting, if not always convincing, new directions.  
Most of those who have previously argued against universal justice—inspired as they have been 
by Marx, Nietzsche, and critical theory—have done so in a roughly continental vein. Muldoon 
not only writes with the clarity and rigor characteristic of top-tier work in the analytic, Anglo-
American idiom, but his defense of diversity is conducted through precisely the sort of informal 
modelling of a social contract pioneered by Rawls himself.  
Even though Muldoon has clearly mastered his chosen method, an economics-inspired model of 
rational agents bargaining over the terms of a social contract is an odd fit for a defense of 
concrete diversity. Muldoon does not see the social contract itself as a tool for the elimination of 
difference through the homogenizing abstraction of homo economicus. His only objection to 
previous work in the social contract tradition is that the depth of difference among imagined 
contractors is relatively shallow, making agreement on principles of justice all-too-easily 
achievable. An assumption of similarity may have once been more plausible than it is now; 
Muldoon makes the odd claim that when Rawls was writing (that is, at the height of the civil 
rights movement, second-wave feminism, and counter-culture) western societies were “relatively 
homogenous, at least culturally if not always ethnically.” Yet this era of alleged homogeneity is 
supposedly now over, and a new kind of social contract theory is needed to account for “new 
demographic realities” (p. 1).  
Muldoon uses the claim that changing times require changing theories to reject the usual 
ambitions of the social contract approach. He refuses to construct a hypothetical situation of 
agreement to specify a conception of justice that ought to regulate all societies. “Even if we 
found a social contact that was optimal for a given set of economic conditions and social 
demographics,” he says, “that contract may become less optimal as social conditions change” (p. 
6). He therefore argues for “justice as a trajectory,” as a series of temporary bargains struck by 
diverse parties who are always ready to renegotiate the terms of their cooperation. 
After discussing the profound diversity of modern societies in Chapter 1, Muldoon devotes 
Chapter 2 to defending the idea that we should not seek a permanent agreement on justice amidst 
all this diversity, but only temporary deals. After modelling in Chapters 3 and 4 how these deals 
are to be struck, Chapter 5 double-checks that they are neither too stable nor too unstable. While 
it is hoped that they will garner significant support at any given moment, Muldoon’s expectation 
is that these deals will ultimately prove unacceptable to those who once agreed to them. Since his 
goal is not to justify a given set of principles for all time, but rather to discover and test new 
principles, this is a feature, not a bug.  
The model for these experiments in justice are John Stuart Mill’s experiments in living. Unlike 
other critics of universalism, Muldoon seems to want to situate himself within the liberal 
tradition, repeatedly presenting his work as an extension of Mill’s. Yet Muldoon’s extension 
stretches Mill’s liberalism to the breaking point. 
What makes Mill a political liberal is that he limits experiments with a high probability of failure 
to the private sphere. When individuals, aware of the risks involved, choose to conduct 
innovative experiments in living, we may celebrate their courage, and be grateful for the 
knowledge that we can all gain as a result, but we need not worry that their failure could harm 
the rest of us. Political experiments are different; many are put at risk without first having the 
opportunity to offer or withhold their informed consent. And while any political experiment 
violates this central principle of research ethics, the gravest dangers stem from experimenting 
with society’s basic structure and the rights of individuals, the institutions to which principles of 
justice are meant to apply.  
Muldoon seems to think that the range of possible experiments in justice, even in a world of 
incredible diversity, is not itself that great—certainly no greater than that typically seen among 
Western liberal democracies. The French will have their laïcité, the British their religious 
establishment, and the Americans their separation of church and state.  As a result, headscarves 
will be banned in certain times and places. While Anglophones may see this as a serious 
injustice, there is always the chance that it will be abandoned with future Francophone 
experimentation. But failed experiments in justice may be corrected too late to compensate their 
victims; if sufficiently atrocious, they may insure that no victims survive to be compensated. 
Anxieties about these sort of risks might be the basis of political conservatism, but they can also 
be the basis of universalist liberalism. While we may be willing to risk failed experiments in 
many areas of public life, we all have certain vital interests that require securing against such 
dangers. Mill himself argues that principles of justice enshrining certain enumerated individual 
rights are needed to provide precisely this security; his, as much as Judith Shklar’s, is a 
liberalism of fear. 
The relationship between liberalism and democracy is notoriously complicated; Shklar described 
it as a marriage of convenience, one that may be headed toward divorce in our own era of 
increasingly illiberal democracies. Even though Mill is both Muldoon’s primary inspiration and 
the source of the epigraph to this book, in his refusal to place individual rights beyond the reach 
of ordinary democratic bargaining, Muldoon has unintentionally placed himself and Mill on 
opposite sides of this messy break-up. 
As such, rather than a contribution to the liberal social contract tradition, Muldoon’s work could 
be better appreciated as a contribution to democratic theory. This contribution could be of 
interest, not only to anti-liberal radical democrats, but also to liberal democrats. Genuine liberals 
must insist that Muldoon’s approach is unsuited to the development of principles of justice. They 
can nonetheless grant that his work might help us better understand how democratic politics can 
or should operate within its proper, constitutionally-delimited bounds. Yet Muldoon does not 
discuss how his model of bargaining about justice might better illuminate the strengths and 
weaknesses of bargaining about more mundane matters. Although he cites several of the social-
scientific work on the benefits of diversity that are typically also cited in recent epistemic 
defenses of democracy, the theories incorporating these findings are absent from his 
bibliography. 
Muldoon’s model is built around a diversity of what he calls “perspectives.” These perspectives 
involve not only different moral values, but also different epistemic features. While he shies 
away from suggesting that alternative perspectives involve alternative facts, they do involve 
cross-cutting categories. For example, in order to make sense of the bewildering array of food 
available at a giant grocery store, Muldoon observes that vegans rightly pay attention to what 
doesn’t contain animal products, while observant Jews look to what is kosher, and dieters to 
what is low-calorie. Muldoon doesn’t seem to worry about those who don’t merely categorize 
things differently than others, but who utterly depart from culinary reality. 
Far from fearing alternative facts, Muldoon insists that a multiplicity of perspectives is 
epistemically useful. In Chapter 3, he defends empathetically multi-perspectival thinking as “the 
view from everywhere,” contrasting it with the allegedly neutral, over-arching perspective of 
Rawlsian public reason, which he sees as an example of Thomas Nagel’s “view from nowhere.” 
There is no objectively best way to categorize and evaluate foodstuffs, but if you want to know 
how to organize your grocery store, be sure to ask vegans, Jews, dieters, and everyone else what 
they think. 
The multi-perspectival “view from everywhere” is also economically useful, allowing for a 
greater division of labor. Their knowledge of vegetable protein gives vegans a comparative 
advantage in the artisanal tofu market, and the gains from trade that result potentially benefit all 
of us. Chapters 4 describes the quest for a social contract as a matter of seeking mutually 
beneficial bargains rather than areas of substantive moral consensus. Everything subject to 
bargaining of this sort gets assigned a price—even individual rights—but the bargaining model is 
designed such that “each is assured that they get more of what they want than they would have in 
a less diverse society,” which in turn “assures that agents are rationally motivated to embrace 
diversity” (p. 5). Sufficiently diverse bargainers may not even agree what they are agreeing to, 
but they can see that an available deal can make them all better off according to their different 
epistemic and evaluative standards. 
Muldoon admits that actual politics might not go as smoothly as this model suggests. For one 
thing, some may deny that there are mutually beneficial bargains to be had. Certain perspectives 
may see the social world as zero-sum, either as a result of epistemological errors about 
comparative advantage or out of a normative commitment to the importance of genuinely zero-
sum goods. Some will even see homogeneity itself as an important good. In such cases, there 
would be nothing irrational in choosing it over the economic gains that diversity would otherwise 
bring. You do not need to be a full-fledged Humean to acknowledge that it is not contrary to 
reason to prefer the destruction of the EU to the presence of Bulgarians in Britain, to allow the 
total ruin of America to prevent Mexicans from crossing its borders, or generally to sacrifice 
one’s own acknowledged economic interest to a homogenous vision of national greatness. Such 
preferences may be morally monstrous, but in order to condemn them as such we must appeal to 
a thicker ethical consensus than Muldoon would allow.  
There is also the related, undiscussed danger that some perspectives will not care about reaching 
a mutually acceptable bargain with others at all, but will be fine with using whatever power they 
have at their disposal to get what they want through coercion. As with so many works of 
mainstream Anglo-American political philosophy, power and inequities in its distribution are 
noticeable by their absence here. Part of the problem is that the agents reaching a bargain are 
reified perspectives, rather than the actual people who embody them. Not only does this make it 
impossible to deal with the much-discussed phenomenon of intersectionality, but it also masks 
the fact that some are the perspectives of majorities and some are perspectives of minorities, that 
some are perspectives of the oppressors and some of the oppressed. 
In order to insure that voluntary bargaining takes place at all, Muldoon may have to depend on 
much more moral uniformity than he thinks. The public consensus needed to avoid coercion 
might even have to look a great deal like the sort of Rawlsian reasonableness that Muldoon 
opposes. Revised versions of Rawls’s political liberalism need not rely on a single, allegedly 
neutral perspective of public reason, but instead on a basic moral commitment that those with 
otherwise opposing perspectives can share. This moral commitment might be better described as 
a matter of reciprocity or mutual respect rather than in Rawls’s own language of reasonableness. 
However, it will involve the same desire to see others freely adopt the social arrangements that 
one is proposing, and an unwillingness to impose them by force whenever others are also 
unwilling to do so.  
There is no denying that this moral commitment to reciprocity is in some sense a liberal one, and 
that anyone who shares it is already on the road to political liberalism. Muldoon rejects such an 
approach as unrealistic; “it would be appropriate if the world were now full of Rawlsian political 
liberals, but instead we find ourselves in a world that is more likely than before for people to 
encounter others who have substantially different comprehensive moral doctrines, and who see 
the world in quite different terms” (p. 2).  
Although non-ideal theory and political realism are all the rage right now, Muldoon needs to be 
careful about exactly how non-ideal his version of social contract theory is meant to be. 
Increasing the amount of diversity that a model of a social contract assumes does not make it any 
less ideal. Remember, diversity itself is an ideal—one of the most powerful ideals of our time. If 
we were to be thorough-going realists—doing theory for the sort of grim world described by 
political scientists like Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels—we would have to describe a social 
contract for agents who are not only extremely different from one another, but also epistemically 
irresponsible, prudentially myopic, and preeminently concerned with signaling loyalty to various 
identity groups.  
Learning that this is what our fellow citizens are really like may make it impossible to move 
“beyond tolerance,” or even so much as to achieve it. Our unreasonable political opponents 
deserve only agonistic respect; they are not to be degraded our dehumanized, but they must be 
defeated if liberal democracy is to survive. One thing we must not do is tolerate them in the 
name of a misguided ideal of diversity; that a society is more diverse when it contains a broad 
array of fascistic deplorables is not something to be said in its favor. Multiple perspectives 
certainly have their epistemic uses—and one of the greatest arguments for liberalism is its 
compatibility with a very wide range of moral doctrines—but diversity as such is not the 
summum bonum of politics. 
 
 
 
 
